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The process of translating research into policy has gained considerable attention
in recent years and a number of studies have investigated the nexus between the
two ‘worlds’ of research and policy. One issue that has been little addressed is
about the boundaries between research and advocacy: how far scientists do, or
should, promote particular findings to policy makers and others. This article
analyses a particular intervention in malaria control and the Consortium set up
to accelerate its potential implementation. Using a framework that emphasizes
the interplay of interests, institutions and ideas, it provides an example of how a
network of committed researchers and funders attempted to follow a rational
policy process, but faced conflicts and fundamental questions about their roles
in generating scientific evidence and influencing global health policy. In an era
of ever more and larger researcher groups and consortia, the findings offer
insights and lessons to those engaged in the process of knowledge translation.
Keywords research–advocacy–policy interface, knowledge translation, interests, ideas,
institutions
KEY MESSAGES
 There is an enduring tension within the policy process between perceptions of rigour, time urgency and the role of science
vs advocacy.
 Research consortia, which include scientific investigators, policy makers and sponsors, need to recognize the potential
development of tensions in the process of gathering evidence and advocating policy and therefore be prepared to manage
what can be a complex process.
 Making review processes explicit and acknowledging the different pressures on actors’ interests and institutions will help
to broker disagreements about the boundaries between science and advocacy.
Introduction
The process of translating research or knowledge into policy has
attracted great interest among researchers, funders and policy
makers (Lavis 2006; Oxman et al. 2009). A number of models
(from rational to enlightenment approaches) have been
generated to describe how research can be translated into
policy (Buse et al. 2012). Most observers agree that barriers to
rational policy making abound (Walt 1994; Black 2001) and
that few global health interventions are evidence based
(Buekens et al. 2004). Even ‘gold standard’ evidence produced
by randomized controlled trials is often undermined by factors
such as bias or pressure (Davis and Howden-Chapman 1996;
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Moher et al. 1999). Yet, many still aspire to following a rational
process from evidence or knowledge production to policy
formulation and implementation.
Although guidelines exist on competing interests (see e.g.
The PLoS Medicine Editors 2008), and some studies have
explored issues such as bias and selective reporting in research
and publication of findings (e.g. Cook et al. 2007), fewer have
looked at potential conflict of interests in research partnerships
or networks (Stuckler et al. 2011) or raised questions about the
boundaries between research and advocacy (Sufrin and Ross
2008). This is a neglected field. But in a current context where
researchers increasingly work more closely with funders and
policy makers, these become essential questions. As policy
makers and funders invest substantial resources on research
networks, play active roles within those networks and press for
evidence to inform policy, the boundaries between science and
advocacy may be challenged.
The case of IPTi: gathering the evidence
This article explores one case where contestation around the
evidence on Intermittent Preventive Treatment among Infants
(IPTi) led to a prolonged debate as to whether the intervention
should be adopted as a policy. It serves as an example of how
complex the demarcation between disseminating research
results and advocating such results can be.
In 2001, the results of a randomized controlled trial in Tanzania
using IPTi,1 employing sulphadoxine–pyrimethamine (SP),
delivered through the Expanded Programme on Immunisation
showed that this could be a useful intervention. It reduced clinical
malaria episodes by 59% and had other beneficial effects such as
reduced anaemia and hospital admissions (Schellenberg et al.
2001). On the basis of this trial and others (Massaga et al. 2003), a
group of researchers established the IPTi Consortium in 2003.
Funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
Consortium set out to test the intervention in more settings. It
was confident, based on the findings from the first trial, that
further research would rapidly guide a global policy recommen-
dation by the World Health Organization (WHO) on the
appropriateness of IPTi for developing countries. A specific
Policy Platform was established within WHO to facilitate the
process of translating knowledge into action. However, by mid-
2007, in spite of a wealth of evidence on IPTi (see Table 1 which
provides a summary of the trials supported by the IPTi
Consortium), the policy process appeared to be stalled as a
WHO recommendation was not forthcoming. Between 2007 and
2009, when the WHO finally endorsed the adoption of IPTi, there
was a flurry of activity to promote the intervention and to
accelerate the process of reaching a global decision. Using the lens
of interests, ideas and institutions, this article explores the
process of moving from gathering and reviewing evidence to
agreeing a global policy recommendation.
Analytical framework and methods
Rather than assume a rational approach to the research–policy
process, the study started from the viewpoint that the process
of funding, undertaking and communicating research is a
messy and iterative process (Weiss 1979). This was a
retrospective case study, and we analysed our data by drawing
on concepts from Walt and Gilson (1994) on context, actors
and process and from Shiffman and Smith (2007) on the role
of ideas and how issues are framed. We brought these concepts
together and organized our findings under a framework of
interests, institutions and ideas (Howlett et al. 2009), high-
lighting the interests (of the different actors), institutions and
ideas (research evidence). The concept of institutions is used in
two ways. One, to denote organizations such as WHO, and two,
as the sets of ‘formal and informal rules, enforcement cha-
racteristics of rules and norms of behaviour that structure
repeated human interaction’ (North 1989, p. 1321) as well as the
strategies adopted by such organizations (Ostrom in Sabatier
2007). The interplay of these factors has been usefully illustrated
by others (e.g. Sumner et al. 2011). In talking about the actors,
we refer to a malaria network and policy community. The latter
is defined as the group of scientists, researchers, policy makers
and funders specifically interested in IPTi, who made up the IPTi
Consortium. The concept of network is used more broadly, to
include malarialogists involved in other interventions, scientific
journalists, malaria programme managers and other
organizations involved in malaria.
We used qualitative methods of investigation, combining an
analysis of global-level issues with insights from national-level
processes. Observational data were gleaned from international
meetings and conferences between December 2008 and January
2009, including the last annual meeting of the IPTi Consortium.
Participation in these meetings offered the opportunity for
informal interviews with 20 participants, including country
malaria programme managers and researchers. A total of 62
documents and papers informed the final write up of this
study: these focused on malaria, the research–policy nexus and
IPTi. We conducted a search on PubMed of all studies
published on IPTi (as well as other malaria interventions) to
develop a timeline on the accumulation of evidence on IPTi and
to contextualize key events in the policy process.
Specific guides for semi-structured interviews were con-
structed for both global- and country-level interviews. The
sample of interviewees followed a purposive approach com-
bined with a snowball technique. Global-level informants were
formally interviewed between January and June 2009. In total,
we interviewed 22 individuals at global level: 9 researchers, 7
policy makers, 4 researcher/policy makers and 2 funders.
Country interviews were largely generated through two
embedded case studies, in Ghana and Tanzania between
March and April 2009. The total number of interviews
conducted in both countries was 22, which involved 29
individuals: 8 from research, 8 from Ministries of Health and
13 from donor agencies. More details are available from
Oliveira-Cruz and Walt (2009).
Before discussing findings, we provide a narrative back-
ground, providing the context within which research and policy
occurred.
Background
Context matters: global attention for malaria
Malaria is a highly complex disease, demanding wide-ranging
research that includes molecular and genetic science, modelling
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and applying specific interventions for prevention and treat-
ment. In 2009, >3.3 billion people were at risk of malaria
transmission (WHO 2010a,b). Most confirmed cases occur in
Africa, and >80% are among children below 5 years of age
(WHO 2008).
Global attention for malaria shifted from grand aspirations in
the 1960s (when eradication was the goal) to neglect in the
1970s and 1980s, to a recovered vision in the 1990s (Bradley
1999). Resurgence in attention was accompanied by a huge rise
in the funds available for both research and control. From
approximate expenditure of US$ 20 million in the 1980s,
malaria funding grew in 1995 to US$ 85 million, reaching US$
4 billion by 2009 (Global Fund 2009).
The increase in funding brought new and more investigators
into the malaria field, providing opportunities for research, and
led to greater discussion about the paucity of interventions
against malaria. At the end of the 1990s, there were limited
tools that were recommended by WHO and that countries could
implement for malaria treatment and control. Chloroquine was
still the most utilized drug for treatment of malaria in Africa, in
spite of known, large-scale resistance (Shretta et al. 2000). But
moves by African Ministries of Health towards using SP, which
was widely available, inexpensive and more efficacious, were
slow (Shretta et al. 2000; Williams et al. 2004). Tanzania, for
example, only introduced SP in 2001. Thus, when the positive
findings were reported in 2001 from the IPTi study in Ifakara,
Tanzania, there were only a few interventions for malaria
control (see Figure 1).
Moreover, the policies recommending the various interven-
tions were supported by different levels of evidence. For
example, WHO in 2000 recommended (WHO 2000) an
intervention for the Intermittent Preventive Treatment of
Pregnant Women (IPTp) on the basis of very limited evidence
(Parise et al. 1998; Shulman et al. 1999) and within a short time
frame between results and recommendations. This contrasted
with a much slower policy process on the efficacy of insecticide-
treated bed nets, for which there was ample evidence (Alonso
et al. 1991; Lengeler 2004) but which took much longer to be
recommended by WHO—only in 2003 (WHO 2003). In this
case, the reason seemed to be a more cautious approach
following the rapidity and limited evidence underlying the IPTp
policy recommendation. By the mid-2000s, WHO had restruc-
tured its global malaria policy to recommend countries focus on
case control using ACTs, long-lasting insecticide-treated bed
nets, IRS and IPTp.
However, although these interventions were advocated by
WHO, country uptake was slow and uneven. Cliff et al. (2010),
for example, show how disparate interests and ideas slowed the
uptake of bed nets in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Countries
also lacked clear scientific guidance as to which intervention to
choose in the absence of evidence on the effectiveness of
treated bed nets vs indoor residual household spraying with
insecticides (Woelk et al. 2009). Slow adoption is not particular
to malaria interventions. As suggested by Shearer et al. (2010),
the adoption of Hib vaccine in resource-poor countries was slow
until certain factors were in place: financing, advocacy efforts,
interpersonal contact with national decision makers and
technical support.
The combination of the resurgence in effort and interest in
malaria, plus the impetus towards research collaboration
through partnerships, meant that malaria policy was being
implemented in a highly dynamic environment, making the
resulting scientific and policy discourses less predictable and
fast changing.
Developing the evidence: the IPTi Consortium
and review process
In the context of increasing interest on malaria and greater
availability of funding for malaria, but few effective interven-
tions, the results of the first IPTi study reported in 2001
(Schellenberg et al.) generated enthusiasm among the core
group of scientists involved in the trial. This research group
alongside others formed the IPTi Consortium in 2003 following
new trials that were initiated in Gabon, Ghana and
Mozambique in 2002 and 2003 to test the intervention.
The primary aim of the IPTi Consortium was to generate
scientifically robust evidence that would inform policy and
practice on IPTi in Africa (IPTi Consortium 2003). The
Consortium was made up of a group of researchers and
international policy makers. Members included a number of
research groups; its funder, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation; staff in the Tropical Diseases Research programme
at the WHO (who had funded and supported the Ifakara trial)
and UNICEF, which saw potential benefits in adding IPTi to its
Child Survival-Immunisation Plus strategy (IPTi Consortium
2003).
To facilitate the review of evidence gathered through
the Consortium’s research groups, a Policy Platform was
established in WHO (2006). Its role was to prepare the evidence
from the IPTi studies for a WHO technical review process, so
that the Organization could reach a global recommendation on
IPTi.
WHO 
recommended 
IPTp 
WHO 
recommended 
bed nets 
1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 
Bed nets 
trial (Alonso
et al. 1991) 
IPTp trial 
(Parise et al.
1998)
IPTp trial 
(Shulman 
et al. 1999)
 
IPTi trial in 
Tanzania 
(Schellenberg 
et al. 2001) 
Bed nets 
Cochrane 
review 
(Lengeler
2004) 
Figure 1 Timeline of selected malaria control interventions: evidence and policy recommendations
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This technical review process involved the assessment of
evidence by a series of WHO committees at different levels
(see Table 2).
The first Technical Expert Group (TEG) meeting in October
2006 assessed the results of 11 studies on the efficacy and
safety of IPTi in infants and children (WHO TEG 2006). All
were conducted in Africa in areas of different transmission
patterns. The studies included six IPTi-SP trials, one IPTi trial
with an alternative drug combination (amodiaquine and
artesunate) and four other IPT trials (either for children with
anaemia or for children in areas of seasonal malaria2). At the
time of the 2006 review, three of the six trials on efficacy and
safety were not yet published—two were complete and one was
still on-going (WHO TEG 2006; IPTi Consortium 2009). The
recommendation of the 2006 TEG was that:
In settings where SP remains effective, the benefits of IPTi
using SP appear to outweigh the risks . . . IPTi is a promising
new intervention to consider adding to the package of
available interventions for malaria control where there is
malaria burden in infants (WHO TEG 2006, p. 11).
The two provisos for this recommendation were that: (1)
implementation would take place alongside rigorous systems of
monitoring and not at the expense of other malaria control
interventions and (2) as additional data on IPTi emerged, there
would be further assessments of the intervention.
This TEG recommendation went to the Technical Research
Advisory Committee in December 2006 where it was endorsed.
The next and final level of review, before going to the WHO
Director General, was at the Scientific Technical Advisory
Committee due to be held in May 2007. However, WHO
cancelled this meeting and decided that a second TEG should
be convened. This decision was triggered by the availability of the
final results of the Kumasi and Tamale IPTi-SP trials in Ghana in
early 2007, which reported some rebound effects of anaemia and
the occurrence of severe adverse reactions (potentially Stevens–
Johnson syndrome). It was only in October 2007 that the second
TEG meeting took place. It reviewed the existing evidence,
including data from the completed and published (or in press at
the time) trials, and assessed additional data and analysis
requested at the first TEG review in October 2006—which the
IPTi Consortium had provided in April 2007.
Although this second TEG recognized IPTi using SP as a
‘. . . promising intervention . . .’ it recommended another review
be held in 2008 when new data became available (WHO TEG
2007, p. 7):
Taking into account these safety concerns . . . the uncertainty
over the magnitude of the protective effect against anaemia
and severe malaria, the uncertainty concerning the efficacy
against highly SP resistant parasites and the optimal dose
and timing of administration, the committee cannot
recommend general deployment of SP-IPTi (WHO TEG
2007, p. 7).
Many in the Consortium felt the review process had stalled
after the TEG in 2007 and questioned the generalizability of the
findings that had led to its cautious conclusion. In an attempt
to drive forward the process, the Gates Foundation commis-
sioned a study from the Institute of Medicine (IoM) in mid-
2007 to evaluate the IPTi results. A year later, in July 2008, the
IoM review was finalized and provided a more positive
conclusion on IPTi:
[There is] substantial evidence indicating that IPTi-SP
significantly diminished the incidence of clinical malaria
in infants living in areas of high and moderate intensity
transmission . . . a wealth of data supports the . . . safety of
SP dosages currently recommended for these age groups . . . .
[and] . . . that an intervention with results of this magnitude
is worthy of further investment (Institute of Medicine 2008,
pp. 2 and 61).
The last meeting of the Consortium was held in January 2009.
Given the turbulence of 2007 and 2008, its members were
determined to see the policy process through to a final
conclusion. They advocated the setting of a date for another
TEG to review new and emerging evidence from the UNICEF
multi-country study and others. As a new director of Global
Malaria Programme (GMP) was expected imminently, the
acting director agreed to convene a third TEG meeting. This
meeting reviewed evidence presented to the two previous WHO
reviews as well as additional data on: severe skin reactions to
SP, the study in Southern Tanzania and the multi-country pilot
implementation studies led by UNICEF and finally, two trials
(in Kilimanjaro and Kisumu) that used other additional anti-
malarial drugs (WHO TEG 2009).
The recommendation of the third TEG was that ‘SP-IPTi
delivered through EPI be considered for implementation as an
additional malaria control intervention . . . in areas with moder-
ate to high transmission’ (WHO TEG 2009, p. 5). In April 2009,
the fourth TEG endorsed a global policy recommendation on
IPTi by WHO to member states seeking to control malaria
(WHO 2010a,b). WHO guidelines on the adoption of IPTi were
completed and disseminated to countries in 2011 (WHO and
UNICEF 2011).
Table 2 Dates and decisions of the WHO review process
2006  In October, the first TEG meeting recommended IPTi
 In December, the Technical Research Advisory Committee
endorsed the first TEG recommendation
2007  In May, the Scientific Technical Advisory Committee
meeting was cancelled as WHO assessed new evidence
on IPTi which reported severe skin reactions to SP in
Ghana
 In June, the Gates Foundation commissioned an independent
review of IPTi by the IoM to review all evidence, including
the latest data from Ghana
 In October, the second TEG meeting did not recommend IPTi
in view of a number of uncertainties
2008  In June, the IoM review presented the results of its review,
concluding that IPTi merited further investment
2009  In April, the third TEG meeting recommended IPTi as a
policy with some caveats and TRAC endorsed this
recommendation
 In October, the IPTi recommendation was reviewed and
endorsed by the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts
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Why did a research process start as consensual, but end up as
one of high tension between members of the Consortium?
What split the tightly knit policy community of different actors
who had coalesced around agreed research questions and a
belief that the knowledge generated through research would
result in a rapid global policy recommendation? The findings
that emerged from the analysis of events around the process of
moving from research to a policy recommendation are best
understood as an interplay between ideas, interests and
institutions. In the discussion below, institutions and interests
are presented together because they are closely inter-linked.
Actors’ interests (or agency) are often closely aligned with the
institutions (or structures) they belong to and abide by
(Buse et al. 2012). Interests thus represent different levels of
power, whether of resources (financial or knowledge), status or
position, or ability to mobilize others.
Findings
Institutions and interests
Working within institutional norms and rules are the actors
who have particular interests and who create knowledge,
promote and advocate change. The WHO review process to
reach a global decision on IPTi reflected the tensions between
different interests and institutional norms. WHO’s rules, norms
and strategies include ways of achieving consensus among
experts (technical and programmatic) to reach global recom-
mendations on a variety of health matters, and then providing
global guidelines to assist countries in their implementation.
Although the evidence-gathering process within WHO has been
criticized (Oxman et al. 2007), views differ on the extent to
which assessment of evidence has improved and the exigency
with which it is followed by different departments (Lancet
2007). Few, however, would disagree that the process is
strongly underpinned by public health and ethical values (‘do
no harm’) and by the need to include low-income country
perspectives and realities. In this regard, respondents from the
case study countries and other representatives from sub-
Saharan countries confirmed that WHO’s technical advice was
highly regarded in their countries. And given the divergence of
opinion on findings expressed at the various technical review
meetings (Table 2), a number of interviewees from developing
countries were sympathetic to WHO’s caution in making a
recommendation. Others have recognized that disagreements
over appropriate malaria strategies at national level are not
uncommon (Woelk et al. 2009).
The IPTi Consortium was designed to draw on its strengths as
a group of researchers, funders and policy makers: to support,
analyse and synthesize the findings from a number of studies
across various disciplines and through the Policy Platform to
inform the review process to get a global policy decision. The
Policy Platform was an innovative idea, perceived to be a
mechanism for research translation and policy adoption.
However, the Consortium was made up of actors from different
organizations, with different institutional norms, even if the
members were united in their aim to test a specific intervention
that would reduce morbidity and mortality from malaria,
especially among children. The primary objectives of their
organizations ranged from a focus on science to a concern with
delivering programmes and agreeing global malaria policy.
These organizations also had different levels of power and
influence, as judged by the resources they could draw on and
their scientific status, among other things.
One of the Consortium’s most influential members was the
Gates Foundation, credited with inaugurating a new era of
scientific commitment to global health problems through its
energetic advocacy (Lancet 2009) and research (Black et al.
2009). Its support for the IPTi Consortium formed part of this
investment. As a ‘hands-on’ funder, the Foundation’s participa-
tion in key meetings of the Consortium was largely seen as
positive and helpful, particularly in the instance of the ‘lost
year’ of 2008 when frustrations among Consortium members
had reached a peak because they perceived the WHO review
process to have stalled. In their view, the review process lacked
transparency (review body members were not always perceived
to be appropriate) and was too influenced by the director at the
time—who was also believed to have reservations about IPTi-SP
as a prevention tool. This period, thus, exposed tensions as to
whose mandate it was to translate evidence into practice. WHO
felt pressurized by the Foundation to move faster than it
deemed reasonable. The Foundation responded to other
Consortium members’ perceptions of a stagnant process, by,
for example, commissioning the IoM review. This was then
criticized by some as challenging WHO’s TEG review system
without taking into sufficient consideration the responsibilities
the Organization had towards its country members when
providing a global policy recommendation.
Certainly, a number of respondents observed that there was a
potential basic tension between the Foundation’s close involve-
ment in the research and policy processes and speculated about
the extent to which this might influence scientific proceedings.
For example, some researchers noted a potential conflict of
interest where their institutions were being funded by Gates
Foundation grants for research other than their own, or where
they were involved in other projects supported with resources
from the Foundation. Others feared that discussion, especially
where there was contention, might not be openly expressed or
that less experienced or senior researchers would be intimi-
dated by questioning procedures or entering into debates.
WHO, on the other hand, has long struggled to maintain its
global role and reputation (Frenk 2008). It has had to compete
with many other organizations for resources. The re-design of
the malaria programme in 2005 with the appointment of a new
director was observed to have led to an infusion of strategic
focus to GMP by separating it from the Roll Back Malaria
programme and rejuvenating and streamlining internal WHO
processes, including the system for reviewing evidence before
approving policy decisions. This could be said to have been an
attempt to regain lost ground as more actors (the Global Fund,
the Gates Foundation, the Roll Back Malaria initiative) entered
the malaria field. As for the Policy Platform, from its
foundation, it was in an ambiguous relationship within the
organization. It was the brainchild of the Consortium, but part
of the GMP. One of its first actions was to support the
independent TEG held in 2006. But when the reports of
potential adverse responses were made, the Policy Platform was
caught between strongly committed and convinced Consortium
members and uncertainty about safety emanating from
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researchers and programme managers within and outside the
Consortium. Thus, a key assumption embedded in the original
concept of the Policy Platform did not materialize: that policy
community cohesion would remain high and the Policy
Platform would direct the policy process rapidly towards a
decision. In the event, the Policy Platform was unable to
negotiate the tensions over the distinct expectations and
institutional strategies of the various actors involved in the
policy community.
Ideas
The ways ideas are framed and understood both within policy
communities and networks or by the wider public can make a
difference to the political support they engender and their
translation into policy and practice. In the light of the positive
results from Ifakara, the policy community presented IPTi
enthusiastically and consensually as a promising intervention to
address malaria among infants. The Consortium framed its
activities as part of a rational process to translate research into
policy by setting up the Policy Platform in parallel to evidence-
gathering and in order to accelerate the policy process.
There were thus high expectations among Consortium
members that IPTi knowledge transfer would be quick and
that ‘ . . . by the end of 2005 it may be possible to make a policy
recommendation on IPTi’ (IPTi Consortium 2003, p. 15).
Although none of the trials subsequent to the Ifakara study
achieved the same high level of efficacy (Aponte et al. 2009),
the 2006 TEG nevertheless recommended IPTi be introduced
where appropriate. Had this recommendation been endorsed,
the internal framing of a rational policy process would have
been vindicated. However in 2007, it was overturned, reflecting
unanticipated tensions created by contestation over evidence
and differences within the policy community.
In addition, many in the Consortium perceived that the
stalling of what was expected to be a rational review process
between 2007 and 2009 introduced a tension between scientific
independence and advocacy. On the one hand, some inter-
viewees suggested that such was the optimism after the Ifakara
results that advocating for IPTi almost took precedence over
generating the evidence. The confidence in the initial results
and the investment in the Consortium were suggested to have
led to pressure to show results and get the policy endorsed. The
majority of respondents pointed out that the first results were
exciting at a time of very limited alternatives. Nevertheless, one
respondent wondered whether this enthusiasm may have led to
the perception of ‘a party line’ supporting IPTi which could not
be breached. And another observed that ‘once you champion
something you cease to see other people’s points of view’,
implying that advocates became reluctant to take seriously any
shortcomings in IPTi.
Some Consortium members were strongly committed to
contributing to public health by reducing malaria morbidity
and mortality and this included a clear engagement in the
policy process.
As a physician I was trained to ‘do no harm’. But doing
nothing can do harm . . . I always saw the end of the process
as being not just the production of evidence but with the
policy process.
It is unrealistic to think scientists are dispassionate. It is
unavoidable to have a relationship with policy and . . . not to
advocate an intervention that proved to be effective. But
obviously it is necessary to have independent systems of
review.
Others within the Consortium felt, however, that scientists had
to stay neutral and focus on the research.
Scientists have a role in assisting, not leading the policy
process.
I think it is very dangerous when the scientists start getting
too involved in pushing their own interventions . . . ethically
scientists have a responsibility within countries to present
results in a dissemination meeting, submit a formal report
to the ministry of health, and publish to the academic
audience. The process after that is for policy makers to take
forward. In settings with weak capacity scientists can help a
step further, but scientists should not become advocates. It
should not be the Consortium’s role, but of a different
group of people, to get the evidence translated into a policy.
Yet others in the Consortium were torn between science and
advocacy, feeling compelled to generate robust evidence and
also responsible for acting upon the policy process.
I found myself in the difficult position where I
thought . . . it’s on my own conscience whether or not I
can just generate information . . . . [or] do I have some sort
of moral obligation to push for the policy decision . . . .
In short, some noted that the tension between producing the
evidence (which should be an independent process) and
advocating for it was a major conflict of interest. The role of
the Gates Foundation was particularly noted in this regard. Some
felt that the Foundation’s behaviour in using its influence to
accelerate the policy process was questionable, given its role as
both funder (wanting to see positive outcomes and returns on
investment—in this case a WHO recommendation) and member
of the Consortium (co-ordinating and assessing the results from
the various studies). Others were more pragmatic, seeing this as
a struggle between institutional norms: between a globally led
organization desirous of moving fast towards policy and a more
deliberative bureaucracy taking heed of its country members.
Such tensions are common to other issues as well. A study of the
tobacco control policy community noted that although some
members considered themselves as pure advocates and others as
pure scientists, the majority assumed multiple roles along this
spectrum and accepted the role of advocacy in translating
evidence into policy (Mamudu et al. 2011). However, in contrast
to the IPTi experience, consensus among members had developed
over a very long time period, and the policy community had to
exercise vigilance in the face of industry attempts to question
scientific evidence.
Conclusions
The IPTi story illustrates enduring tensions within the policy
process, between perceptions of time urgency and rigorous
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review and between the role of science and advocacy. Relating
the narrative to the framework of institutions, interests and
ideas, it demonstrates how ‘contextual factors’ aligned favour-
ably to shape the process of moving from evidence to policy.
The raised global attention and resources for malaria boosted
the potential for IPTi as a malaria strategy. This dynamic
environment affected a network of ‘interests’ and enabled the
core policy community of researchers to seize the opportunity
provided by a successful study in Tanzania to establish the
Consortium to further evaluate the intervention. We traced how
policy community cohesion was affected by dissension over
evidence and the technical review process and how institutional
norms, values, and power affected the actions of interests and
organizations within the policy process. Finally, we recognized
two sets of ‘ideas’ held by members of the IPTi Consortium that
affected the process of moving from research to policy: one was
expecting the process to be rational—a planned, linear route
from research to a WHO policy decision, and the other was
assuming an advocacy role for the Consortium which was not
endorsed by all of its members.
This article suggests that in an era where it has become
commonplace for diverse groups (researchers, funders, policy
makers) to collaborate in large research projects, a number of
factors need to be taken into account. Although goals may be
shared—providing the rationale on which the collaboration is
based—each group or organization will have their own
particular values and institutional norms. Consensus on
common goals does not obviate groups or organizations
having different levels of power and exercising that power at
different stages of the process, whether in collecting, recording
and interpreting data (where dissension may arise) or in
overriding objections to the early promotion of results or in
promoting particular findings over others. Individuals may be
bound by organizational rules and values which are at variance
with aspects of the research goals or may feel tensions between
scientific claims and promotion of those claims. There may also
be tensions between national vs global level members of a
network relating to different local realities.
In other words, the policy process from research to evidence
to policy is not rational. Weathering some of the exigencies
mentioned above is part of managing the process of knowledge
translation. The key is in the management of the process, which
will differ from context to context, case to case and over time.
First, seeking to understand and taking account of the norms
and values of different members of a group or partnership and
making them explicit may improve brokerage between reaching
consensus among groups with different perceived responsibil-
ities and goals. This is not something that is often explicitly
encouraged, yet it could provide useful pointers to those who
wish to turn policy into practice. Buse (2008) makes the case
for the need for more systematic prospective policy analysis.
Second, making review processes as explicit and transparent
as possible should be a governance aim of all organizations: this
includes open acknowledgement of any potential conflicts of
interest, rigorous consultation processes about who sits on
various bodies in selecting research proposals as well as in
reviewing evidence. Confidence that such processes are as fair
and equitable as possible will allow, and not stifle, scientific
debate and dissension. And confidence in processes will help to
explore and broker any arguments about transgressing the
boundaries between research and advocacy.
Finally, understanding the context and the competencies of
the health system are also key to managing expectations. The
results from an evaluation of implementing IPTi in five districts
in Southern Tanzania showed no effects on child survival
attributable to the intervention (Schellenberg et al. 2011).
Translating evidence into practice depends on systems and
situations that are different from trial conditions. As
Schellenberg et al. say (2011), there are ‘real-life’ challenges
in health systems (e.g. low coverage, late administration) that
can act as significant constrain to the replication of trial results.
Acknowledging the demands of the research and review process
and understanding expectations and contextual elements are
helpful in managing the delicate boundaries between research
and advocacy and those between science and policy as well as
practice.
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Endnotes
1. IPTi is defined as ‘. . .the administration of a full course of an effective
anti-malarial treatment at specified time points to infants at risk of
malaria, regardless of whether or not they are parasitaemic, with
the objective of reducing the infant malaria burden" (WHO TEG,
2006:1).
2. Not always with SP.
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